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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a final order from the Idaho Public Utilities Commission ("IPUC") 
denying Kiki Leslie A. Tidwell ("Ms. Tidwell") reimbursement for intervenor costs. R. vol. I. 
pp. 180-182. 
In her initial brief, Ms. Tidwell argued that the 1) IPUC failed to provide notice of a 
deadline affecting a substantial, legislatively enacted right to intervenor funding requests, 2) the 
IPUC acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused its discretion in denying Ms. Tidwell's request 
for intervenor funding, and 3) the administrative rule used to deny Ms. Tidwell's request for 
intervenor funding is unconstitutionally vague. 
It is crucial to remember that the IPUC published no less than twelve notices and orders 
during the life-span of Case No. IPC-E-16-28. Those notices span almost a year. None of them 
remotely mention Rule 164, any of the triggering events in Rule 164, or the August 22, 2017 
deadline for intervenor funding. Additionally, the IPUC failed to provide intervenor's with notice 
that the last evidentiary hearing had been scheduled. The IPUC further admits that notice of the 
August 22, 2017 deadline for intervenor funding requests was not provided to intervenors. 
Respondent Br. at 15. And finally, the IPUC failed to address whether the August 8, 2017 
evidentiary hearing was the "last evidentiary hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for 
submitting briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position," as stated under Rule 164. See 
Appellant's Br. at 13. 
Ms. Tidwell's arguments are fully explained in her initial brief. This reply brief clarifies 
and expands those arguments below. Ms. Tidwell also attempts to respond to many of the 
incorrect assumptions and arguments the IPUC puts forward in its brief. In its simplest form, this 
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case is a question of whether an agency can set a deadline without noticing it and whether the 
agency misinterpreted its own vague statute. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
Ms. Tidwell's first brief lays out the issues presented to this court. Those issues remain. 
For the purposes ofreplying to the IPUC's arguments and in an attempt to not simply reiterate 
Ms. Tidwell's arguments, the issues presented in this brief are as follows: 
1. Whether Ms. Tidwell adequately raised her arguments before this court in her petition for 
reconsideration with the IPUC. 
2. Whether adequate notice of the Rule 164 deadline was provided. 
3. Whether the IPUC acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in an abuse of discretion in denying 
Ms. Tidwell's petition for intervenor funding. 
4. Whether Rule 164 is unconstitutionally vague. 
5. Whether Ms. Tidwell is entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for an appeal challenging a statutory interpretation and the 
application of an administrative rule is whether the adjudicatory body abused its discretion. 
Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 751 P. 2d 107 (1988), rev'd on 
other grounds. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 
1206, 1219 (1991). Further clarification of what is required to prove an abuse of discretion 
standard is straightforward. "When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court 
rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
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choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise ofreason." State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600, 768 P.2d 1331,1333 (1989) (citing Associates Northwest, Inc. v. 
Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987)). Interestingly, the IPUC's brief 
cites Westby v. Shaefer, 157 Idaho 616,338 P.3d 1220 (2014), Westby v. Shaefer uses the 
standard of review as created in Hedger (abuse of discretion and the factors quoted above), but 
when the IPUC cites Westby v. Shaefer it cites a different standard ofreview. Respondent Br. at 
8. From Ms. Tidwell's perspective, the IPUC is either misstating the appropriate standard of 
review or asking this court to apply a brand new standard ofreview. 
The case before this court requires an abuse of discretion of standard. This standard has 
been upheld in numerous cases concerning questions of law from administrative bodies, 
including cases involving the IPUC. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm 'n, 120 
Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (19 88) ("The decision of the adjudicating body awarding fees will not 
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.") (citing Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 
P.2d 524 (1984)); Building Contractors Assn. of Southwestern Idaho v. Idaho Public Utilities 
Commn., 151 Idaho 10,253 P.3d 684, (2011) ("Building Contractors has not shown that the 
Commission abused its discretion in denying the requested intervenor expenses."). Clearly, 
appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court for questions about petitioners for intervenor funding require 
an abuse of discretion standard ofreview. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Ms. Tidwell Adequately Raised the Arguments in Her Appeal with the IPUC. 
The issues put forward by Ms. Tidwell in her petition for intervenor funding and petition 
for reconsideration are the same issues that Ms. Tidwell is arguing now. See R. vol. I at 178-179. 
Ms. Tidwell was pro se during the time she prepared and submitted both her petition for 
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intervenor funding and petition for reconsideration. Legal counsel is far more adept at explaining 
legal arguments and using the correct vernacular and legal maxims. However, the arguments 
presented by Ms. Tidwell as a pro se litigant in front of the IPUC were sufficient to put the IPUC 
on notice of Ms. Tidwell's arguments, as contained in her initial briefing. 
Ms. Tidwell's petition for intervenor funding and her petition for reconsideration allege 
that proper notice of the Rule 164 deadline was not provided and that the IPUC failed to properly 
interpret the Rule 164. R. Vol. I, p. 178-179. While subsequent briefing has broken those 
allegations down into more specific arguments, the main thrust of those arguments remain the 
same: the IPUC failed to provide notice of a deadline and it abused its discretion in denying Ms. 
Tidwell's petition for intervenor funding. The current arguments that the IPUC acted 
inconsistently and that Rule 164 is unconstitutionally vague are under the umbrella of Ms. 
Tidwell's original argument regarding the correct interpretation of Rule 164 and its application 
to her case. 
It is clear that the IPUC would rather not address Ms. Tidwell's arguments directly and 
instead find a way to ignore their legislatively mandated duties and the requirements of notice 
and reasoned decision making required of agencies. The IPUC had a full and fair opportunity to 
correct its mistakes when Ms. Tidwell filed her petition for intervenor funding and her petition 
for reconsideration. Yet, even though the IPUC had the funds required under Idaho Code § 61-
617 A to reimburse Ms. Tidwell her intervenor expenses, the IPUC instead decided to double-
down on its erroneous and illegal actions. 
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B. The IPUC failed to properly notice the August 22, 2017 deadline for intervenor 
funding requests. 
The crux of Ms. Tidwell's argument is that the IPUC failed to notice the August 22, 2017 
deadline for intervenor funding request. The entire administrative record is devoid of a reference 
to an August 22, 2017 intervenor funding request deadline. Tellingly, the IPUC admits that it did 
not notice the August 22, 2017 deadline. Respondent Br. at 15. Then, the IPUC argues that Rule 
164 speaks for itself. As explained more in Ms. Tidwell's void for vagueness doctrine argument, 
Rule 164 does a lot of things, but speak for itself is not one of them. Not only does Rule 164 
have a clause allowing for an order to waive any requirements under Rule 164, the rule itself 
contains two separate clauses with a contingency that must be interpreted to determine which 
clause applies. Regardless of Rule 164's vagueness, this important fact remains: notice of the 
August 22, 2017 deadline was not given, and the IPUC freely admits so. 
The fact that the transcript contains a one-sentence proclamation by Commissioner 
Anderson is similarly undisputed, but that announcement does not equate to adequate notice of a 
deadline. First, the idea that Ms. Tidwell had notice because the transcript was available upon 
request is absurd. See Respondent Br. at 4, n.2. Without knowing about Commissioner 
Anderson's statement, Ms. Tidwell had no way to know where to look in the administrative 
record for the August 22, 2017 deadline or that she would need to request the transcript. 
Additionally, the cost of requesting a transcript to search for a one sentence statement that you 
do not know exists is prohibitive and similarly ludicrous; it is also one of the reasons this appeal 
only contains a short section of transcript. 
Finally, Rule 16 ofIDAPA requires that all notices be served by U.S. Mail or 
electronically. ID APA 31.01.01.016. The IPUC admits that notice of the August 22, 2017 
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deadline was not provided. Respondent Br. at 15. Then, the IPUC tries to argue that notice was 
not required because the IPUC did not issue an order pertaining to Rule 164. Id. at 14-15. The 
IPUC misinterprets Rule 16, which only provides that orders and notices be served by mail or 
email. IDAPA 31.01.01.016. Rule 16 does not require an order to trigger the notice requirements, 
as claimed by IPUC. Respondent Br. at 14. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the record of this case unequivocally proves that Ms. 
Tidwell and every other intervenor did not receive notice of the August 22, 2017 deadline for 
intervenor funding requests. 
C. The IPUC abused its discretion because the August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing was 
not "the last evidentiary hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for submitting 
briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position," as required under Rule 164. 
The August 8, 2017 evidentiary hearing should not have started the 14-day period for 
petitions for intervenor funding because it was not the last event to occur under Rule 164. Rule 
164 states: 
Unless otherwise provided by order, an intervenor requesting intervenor 
funding must apply no later than fourteen (14) days after the last evidentiary 
hearing in a proceeding or the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed orders, or 
statements of position, whichever is last. 
IDAPA 31.01.01.164 (emphasis added). 
The IPUC admitted that there was no order setting a due date for petitions for 
intervenor funding requests. Respondent Br. at 14-15. Thus, the two deadline options 
contemplated by the rule apply. Either intervenor funding requests were due 14 days after 
the last evidentiary hearing or 14 days after the deadline for submitting briefs, proposed 
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orders, or statements of position. Because there was no order stating otherwise, 
whichever event is last is the triggering event. 
In Ms. Tidwell's case, the last applicable event was the deadline for submitting briefs, 
proposed orders, or statements of position because that deadline was November 16, 2017, which 
is after August 8, 2017. See Appellant's Br. at 13-14. Additionally, Rule 255 allows any party to 
file briefs, proposed orders, or statements of position. IDAPA 31.01.01.255. 
Ms. Tidwell met the Rule 164 deadline even though she did not receive proper notice and 
the IPUC misinterpreted its own poorly written rule because her petition for intervenor funding 
was received on September 20, 2017, before the last chance to file petitions for reconsideration 
and before the case before the IPUC had formally ended. While the IPUC would like to ignore 
the last three words of Rule 164 ("whichever is last."), it is not afforded such discretion unless it 
drafts an order consistent with the rule. The IPUC did not draft an order, and so we are left with 
language of Rule 164 which gave Ms. Tidwell until 14 days after November 2, 2017 to submit 
her request. 
For the foregoing reasons, the deadline for intervenor funding requests was at least as late 
as November 16, 2017, and the IPUC's purported August 22, 2017 deadline was decided 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and in an abuse of discretion. 
D. Rule 164 is unconstitutionally vague. 
The vagueness of Rule 164 should be apparent in the context of the arguments put forth 
by both sides. The void for vagueness doctrine applies to statutes that do not sufficiently warn a 
person of common intelligence as to the proscribed conduct required. H & V Eng' g, Inc. v. Idaho 
State Bd. of Profl Engineers & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,649, 747 P.2d 55, 58 (1987). 
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While Ms. Tidwell contends and maintains that her interpretation of Rule 164 is the 
correct interpretation, it was not one that was arrived at easily. And, it was not until after the 
IPUC erroneously set the intervenor funding request deadline that Ms. Tidwell became aware of 
such deadline. R. vol. I, p. 179. She was, exactly as the doctrine requires, unaware of the 
proscribed conduct that was required of her based solely on reading the rule. Rule 164 simply 
does not alert an intervenor as to what is expected of them. 
The IPUC argues that Rule 164 speaks for itself. Respondent Br. at 15. Rule 164 does a 
lot of things, but speak for itself is not one of them. Not only does Rule 164 have a clause 
allowing for an order to waive any timing requirements under Rule 164, the rule itself contains 
two separate clauses with a contingency that must be interpreted to determine which clause 
applies. IDAPA 31.01.01.164. A lawyer, let alone a layperson, would have a difficult time 
properly interpreting Rule 164. For the above reasons, and those laid out in Ms. Tidwell's initial 
brief, Rule 164 is void for vagueness. 
E. The Commission's Order denying Ms. Tidwell's Intervenor-Funding Request was 
also Unreasonable, Unlawful, Erroneous or Not in Conformity with the law. 
Should this court decide to deviate from prior case law regarding the standard of review 
in appeals from the IPUC, the IPUC still cannot make a valid argument that its order was not 
unreasonable, unlawful, and erroneous. While the standard of review may change, the lack of 
notice and the requirements of Rule 164 do not. As a result, Ms. Tidwell's arguments, as laid out 
above and in her initial briefing, remain the same and show that the IPUC acted unreasonably, 
unlawfully, and erroneously in its application of Rule 164 as well as its interpretation of the rule. 
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F. Ms. Tidwell Is Entitled to Attorney Fees. 
1. Ms. Tidwell satisfies elements of the Idaho's Private Attorney General Doctrine. 
Idaho's private attorney general doctrine applies to cases against the IPUC because courts 
have previously applied the doctrine to cases against the IPUC. In Owner-Operator, even though 
the court ultimately declined to award attorney fees to appellant, they did so because the 
appellant's request failed to meet the required substantive elements of the doctrine, not because 
the doctrine did not apply to the IPUC. Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n v. Idaho 
PUC, 125 Idaho 401,407,871 P.2d 818,824 (1994). 
As argued in Ms. Tidwell's opening brief, her appeal satisfies the requirements of Idaho's 
private attorney general doctrine. Appellant's Br. at 17-18. Contrary to the IPUC's arguments, 
the issues presented by Ms. Tidwell do not only stand to benefit her pecuniary interest. Ms. 
Tidwell is seeking to hold the IPUC accountable to all potential intervenors and require the IPUC 
provide adequate notice of intervenor deadlines. Since every Idahoan has the opportunity to be 
an intervenor, the ruling of this court will affect every single Idahoan. 
2. Ms. Tidwell is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 12-117. 
Agencies, as defined by Idaho Code§ 67-5201(1), does not exclude legislative agencies, 
and therefore the statute forms a basis for an award of attorney fees. While the IPUC is a 
legislatively created agency, Idaho Code§ 67-5201(1) excludes the "legislative branch," not 
agencies created by the legislature. Additionally, Ms. Tidwell does not seek attorney fees from 
the IPUC or legislative branch. She seeks approval by the IPUC to award attorney fees from 
Idaho Power Company, as explained in Idaho Code§ 61-617A. The budget for intervenor 
funding comes from the Idaho Power Company, not the legislature. Accordingly, fees under 
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Idaho Code § 12-117 are appropriate because the award of fees is actually an award of fees from 
the Idaho Power Company. 
3. This forum is appropriate for awarding intervenor funding because the IPUC did not 
otherwise object to Ms. Tidwell's petition under the statutory factors. 
Attorney fees for intervenor's are allowed under Idaho Code § 61-617 A. This provision 
of Idaho code expressly allows for an award of attorney fees to intervenors. Ms. Tidwell 
originally applied to the IPUC for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 61-617 A. R. 
vol. I, pp. 164-165. That request was not denied for failure to satisfy the requirements under the 
statute, but rather because the IPUC erroneously decided that Ms. Tidwell did not apply in time. 
R. vol. I, pp. 175-177. The IPUC contends that this means they did not make a substantive 
decision on Ms. Tidwell's application. Respondent Br. at 24. However, this argument is actually 
a thinly veiled attempt at getting a second chance to deny Ms. Tidwell her funding request. 
Ms. Tidwell applied for intervenor funding in accordance with the statute, and the IPUC 
was given a chance to approve or deny it based on the factors in Idaho Code § 61-617 A. In fact, 
the IPUC was required to make its decision on those factors alone, not Rule 164. Idaho Code § 
61-617 A ("The determination of the commission with regard to the payment of these expenses 
shall be based on the following considerations ... "). The IPUC did not object to any of the 
substance of Ms. Tidwell's application, nor did any other intervenors object to Ms. Tidwell's 
petition for intervenor funding. The IPUC does not need, nor are they allowed, to take a second 
opportunity to deny Ms. Tidwell's application. As a result, Ms. Tidwell believes that if this court 
agrees that her intervenor funding request was timely or if the IPUC's decision to deny her 
request based on timing only was an abuse of discretion, then this court may award Ms. Tidwell 
attorney fees in accordance with the Idaho Code§ 61-617A. 
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In the event Ms. Tidwell prevails on her arguments in this appeal, Ms. Tidwell 
respectfully ask that this court award attorney fees accordingly, including the cost of this appeal. 
4. Ms. Tidwell is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 40 
and 41. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and Rule 41 are a basis for an award of costs and attorney fees. 
Idaho Code § 61-617 A is a statutory provision authorizing an award of attorney fees, which also 
provides the basis for this appeal. As a result, an award of attorney fees and costs under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40 and 41 is appropriate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The IPUC abused its discretion in denying Ms. Tidwell's petition for intervenor funding 
and setting an unnoticed and erroneous deadline under Rule 164. Additionally, Rule 164 is void 
for vagueness. Ms. Tidwell respectfully asks for an award of attorney fees and costs as allowed 
by Idaho Code § 61-617 A. Ms. Tidwell also respectfully requests reasonable attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. 
DATED this ·7_ °l day of May, 2018. 
Samuel L. Linnet 
Attorney for Appellant/Intervenor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 30, 2018, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
 
□ E-Mail 










Donovan E. Walker 
Idaho Power Company 
PO Box 70 







Idaho Public Utilities Commission 
472 W. Washington Street 








 Samuel L. Linnet 
Attorney for Ms. Tidwell 
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